

MINISTERSTVO VNITRA
ČESKÉ REPUBLIKY

**REPORT ON EXTREMISM
IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
IN 2017**

**Ministry of the Interior
Security Policy Department
Prague 2018**

The Report on Extremism in the Czech Republic in 2018 was approved by Government Resolution No. 873 of 17 December 2018.

The present text has not undergone any linguistic or stylistic editing.

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1. Introduction

The Report on Extremism in the Czech Republic in 2018 (Report) is submitted pursuant to Government Resolution no. 394 of 22 May 2017. The Evaluation of the Concept of Combating Extremism in the Czech Republic in 2017 and the Concept of Combating Extremism in 2018 are submitted alongside the Report as separate documents.

The Report does not address all racist and xenophobic manifestations registered in the Czech Republic in 2017. It focuses primarily on members of sympathisers of extremist groups. Some anti-immigration and anti-Muslim groups that do not fulfil the criteria of the definition of extremism as used by the Ministry of the Interior, however, are described in more detail. These groups began using methods and rhetoric similar to those of traditional right-wing extremists. One of them was so influential so as to eclipse traditional right-wing extremist parties. Practically the entire extremist scene had to stand up to this group and was significantly altered by it.

The Report is written by the Ministry of the Interior, with input from the intelligence services, the Police of the Czech Republic, and other state administration bodies – specifically the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office.

Spectator violence, also known as hooliganism, is addressed independently within the Ministry of the Interior.

The Report is written annually. It aims to regularly inform the public about developments on the domestic extremist scene. New measures are adopted based on its findings.

The first section, describing the domestic extremist scene, is based on data provided by the Security Information Service and the Police of the CR, particularly experts on extremism from the National Centre against Organised Crime of the Criminal Police and Investigation Service and Regional Directorates of the Police of the CR.

The statistics in the following section were provided by the Police of the CR, the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, and Ministry of Justice, and the Probation and Mediation Service of the CR.

The third section describes foreign influences affecting the Czech extremist scene. It was written by experts from Masaryk University in Brno with a contribution from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly through Czech Embassies in selected European countries.

The last section includes a list of abbreviations.

The Report uses photographs taken by officers of the Police of the CR. Photographs from other sources, e.g. in the section on foreign influences, are referenced. Photographs without references were taken by an employee of Masaryk University in Brno.

A new feature is statistics of crimes with an extremist subtext committed on the Internet.

2. Definition of extremism

In this Report, the definition of the term “extremism” is identical to that of previous annual reports. The full definition was last published in the Report on Extremism in the Czech Republic in 2002, approved by Government Resolution No. 669 of 9 July 2003.¹ IN this context, it is also relevant to refer to established case law as regards the interpretation of the term “group”² (or “movement”). The full wording of the definition of extremism is available at <http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/co-je-extremismus.aspx> (in Czech only).

Not all entities mentioned in the Report engaged in illegal activities in 2017. From a long-term perspective, however, they fulfil the criteria to be described as extremist, as defined in previous annual reports. The Report may also mention entities that are not extremist. This fact is stated explicitly in the Report, and the links of these entities with the extremist scene are described.

The Report continues to use the term “extremism”. Nevertheless, the Ministry of the Interior, cooperates with institutions that more often use the term “hate crimes” (i.e. offences motivated by hatred, bias, or offences motivated by collective prejudice) and believes that the two terms are complementary and that there is room for strengthening elements of hate crime within law enforcement and judiciary authorities. What the Ministry of the Interior particularly appreciates within the concept of hate crime is the focus on victims of hate crimes and the resulting emphasis on the need for a specific approach of the police and other state authorities.

¹ See <https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/extremismus-vyrocní-zpravy-o-extremismu-a-strategie-boje-proti-extremismu.aspx> (in Czech only).

² In particular, the opinion of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court Tpjn 302/2005 (No. 11/2007 Coll.) and Resolutions of the Supreme Court 5 Tdo 79/2006, 5 Tdo 337/2002, 3 Tdo 1174/2004, and Resolution 4 T 98/2009 of the Regional Court in Brno.

3. Report on Extremism in the Czech Republic in 2017

3.1. Main Events and Trends – Summary

Right-wing extremist movements were very fragmented. In the long-term, the Workers' Party of Social Justice (*Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti*) and National Democracy (*Národní demokracie*) political parties remained unable to mobilise or gain new followers, and their support dwindled, to the benefit of populist entities. Groups stemming from the neo-Nazi movement, Generation Identity (*Generace identity*) and Pro-Nation (*Pro-Vlast*), made exceptional appearances. In fact, the traditional neo-Nazi wing ceased to express itself publicly.

Left-wing extremist movements were dominated by anarchists. It was evident from the topics and campaigns prevalent in 2017 that anarchists were trying to reach other entities across the entire left-wing spectrum and to attract public attention. They focused on topics acceptable to the wider public, such as social housing, environmental protection, or curbing expressions of racism and xenophobia. The radical communist movement was only a marginal player on the extremist scene.


Paramilitary and domestic militia groups continued to be active. In 2017, there were three relevant entities. These fought among themselves, thus diminishing their own significance. Their events were mostly spontaneous and were intended to promote the individual groups. Their leaders were unable to come up with long-term concepts or visions.

Populist anti-immigration and anti-Muslim groups began to take over the space formerly occupied by traditional right-wing extremist groups. These non-extremist entities successfully adopted extremist rhetoric. Just like extremists, they used manipulative campaigns and contributed to creating an atmosphere of fear and to polarising society. They fostered the spread of hateful opinions even among the wider public. There was an increase of hate speech on the Internet, where most of the perpetrators were neither members nor sympathisers of traditional extremist groups.

As regards criminal activity and public events, no incidents were recorded in 2017 that would fall outside the norm of previous long-term trends.

In 2017, the Police of the CR recorded **153 crimes with an extremist subtext**. Of those, **102 were solved**. In addition, **132 persons were prosecuted** for crimes with an extremist subtext.

There were **344 events**, of which 99 were organised by extreme-right groups. A total of 235 events were linked to groups or individuals identifying with the extreme-left. Further information about the types of activities is shown in the graph below, which was created by the Police of the CR.



3.2. Main Security Threats and Risks for the CR

Previous years have shown that, as regards the spread of hatred and polarisation of society, **there have been some significant structural shifts in a relatively short time**. Political topics previously typical for right-wing extremists are today being used to much greater effect by populists, who also have greater clout. Leaders who cultivate xenophobic profiles easily point to the supposed culprits of perceived negative social phenomena. As regards xenophobic groups, a shift from anti-Roma to anti-Muslim and anti-immigration attacks was observed. Once the potential for mobilisation brought about by the migration crisis subsides, we can expect a return to traditional xenophobic topics, including the resurfacing of the so-called Roma subject.

Today, the main threat is no longer posed by traditional right-wing extremist entities, but **by xenophobic and populist entities**. Although they have no ties with extremist militants and officially distance themselves from totalitarian ideologies, they broadcast very similar thoughts. Outwardly, they open otherwise legitimate political topics (e.g. migration), however they do so through ways and means that incite hatred to certain groups of people and deepen divisions within society and distrust in democratic mechanisms. They are able to mobilise the public much more efficiently and quickly. Their influence on the content and the direction of public debate and political decisions cannot be compared to that of traditional extremists. It is a slow and difficult process for democratic institutions to find defence mechanisms against these entities.

The polarisation of society is helped along by the **rapid spread of hate speech on the Internet**. So-called **quasi-media projects** very eagerly and adeptly help spread hatred, presenting themselves as complementary or “uncensored” sources of information, however in practice (and often deliberately) propagating half-truths, disinformation, opinions inciting to hatred, thus reflecting and further spreading frustration and fostering emotional and irrational ways of processing information.

Furthermore, **extremist and populist entities have a tendency to influence strategic security decisions**, e.g. NATO and EU membership, be it intentionally or as a by-product of instrumental sing topics that mobilise society for the purpose of gaining political power.

The status quo may potentially generate **militant groups and individuals that will tend to act violently**. They may or may not be traditional extremists.

3.3. Right-Wing Extremism

General Information

Owing to the decrease in the mobilisation potential of anti-immigration and anti-Muslim activities, the extreme right had to focus on other topics. Thus, it attacked the EU, NATO, the political leadership, human rights activists and NGOs. Occasionally, it reverted back to anti-Roma outbursts.

The Internet has become the main platform for crimes committed by the extreme right. Nevertheless, crimes with an extremist subtext are increasingly committed by persons without direct ties to the extremist scene.

Representatives of some right-wing extremist entities continued to express a positive attitude to the current official policy of the Russian Federation, including, inter alia, attempts at disrupting the internal cohesion of the EU and its Member States, including the Czech Republic, and weakening and undermining the trust in democratic institutions and societies.

The popularity and support of politically active right-wing extremists was minimal. This was reflected in the election outcomes, which were a complete failure for these entities. Their traditional topics were put to much better use mainly by the movement Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura (*Svoboda a přímá demokracie – Tomio Okamura*).

Contacts between Czech and foreign right-wing extremists took on various forms, e.g. reciprocal attendance at various public events or concerts. The Czech extremists' main partners were their counterparts in Slovakia, Germany, and Poland.


The relationship between the extreme right and so-called quasi-media projects can be defined as a mutually beneficial symbiosis.

Public Events Organised by Right-Wing Extremists in 2017

Type of Event	Number
Public rallies, demonstrations	41
White Power concerts	14
Other	44
Total	99

The total number of 99 public events was lower than in 2016, when there were 129. The number of private neo-Nazi concerts, of which there were 14, stands out. The category “other” includes, for example, lectures, discussions, commercial concerts with a high attendance by right-wing extremists, conferences, or other non-public events.

Crimes Committed on the Internet in 2017 (as of 30 September 2017)



Source: Police of the CR

An increasing number of investigated crimes **takes place on the Internet**, particularly in discussions and posts on social media. As of 30 September 2017, a total of **57 cases of online content that incited to violence or hatred or defamed groups of people or individuals for their race, ethnicity, or political or religious beliefs**.

Dangerous threatening, support of movements aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms or even the denial, approval, and impugnation of genocide form a significant part of criminal activity online. It is in this area in particular that the continuous activity of persons that otherwise do not appear to be supporters of extremist movements is registered. These persons often repeatedly resort to hate speech. Some of them tend to support xenophobic and populist entities.

Most often, hate speech was aimed at religious and ethnic groups, particularly Muslims and the Roma community. Notable cases included those of **hate speech and threats aimed at the Banga brothers as well as reactions to a photograph of first grade pupils at an elementary school in Teplice published in a local newspaper.** In connection with the increase not only of hate speech, but also of disinformation and manipulative content online, the police report **an improvement in communication with service providers.** When breaches of service occur, service providers remove the content themselves.

Workers' Party of Social Justice (*Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti, DSSS*)

For the DSSS, 2017 was by all means an unsuccessful year. The entity lost its capacity to mobilise its followers and to recruit new ones. **During the parliamentary elections, the**

party only garnered 0.2 % votes (10 402 ballots). Its campaign was minimalistic, and in comparison to previous years its promotion via pre-election rallies was also weaker.



The May Day demonstration in Brno.

demonstration. They formed several smaller groups, trying to block the route of the march. The police therefore intervened repeatedly.

Another traditional rally, commemorating 17 November in Prague, was attended by only about 90 persons. The famous American right-wing extremist Matthew Heimbach made his second appearance in the Czech Republic during the event. At the end of the rally, a group of about 20 participants set out on a spontaneous march through the city centre. Two of them were then detained by the police for disobeying a police officer's instructions.

The formerly significant Saint Wenceslas rallies, most recently organized by the DSSS in Svitavy on 28 September, were only attended by 40 people.

On 18 November, the DSSS organised a **congress of the pan-European Alliance for Peace and Freedom (AFP)**, of which it is a member. The congress was attended by the AFP's chair, Roberto Fiore, and vice-chair, Nick Griffin. Speeches were given by representatives of foreign extremist parties, such as the National Democratic Party of Germany (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, NPD), the People's Party Our Slovakia (*Ludová strana Naše Slovensko*) or Romania's The New Right (*Noua Dreaptă*). However, the congress failed to bring the DSSS the expected foreign policy points. Due to the proceedings within the European Parliament, the future of the AFP is relatively uncertain.

Among so-called quasi-media projects, the DSSS was given airspace particularly by *Svobodné rádio* („Free Radio“).

The party's regional organisations in the Karlovarský region and in Prague were less active. Following the parliamentary elections in October, the long-time chairman of the Prague branch Jiří Pětivalský announced his departure from the party.

Some representatives of the Workers' Youth felt somewhat disappointed by the inefficiency of the DSSS leadership. The “youth” accounted for the more dynamic component of the symbiosis with the DSSS. They participated in organising public events and their knowledge of languages helped create and maintain contacts abroad. Jakub Svoboda replaced Hynek Rynek as chairman of Workers' Youth.

National Democracy

National Democracy (ND) formerly placed its bets on an exacerbated, hateful and insulting rhetoric and provocative activities whose purpose was to garner public interest and a privileged position on the right-wing extremist and xenophobic scene. **In 2017, it became evident that this strategy has not been successful in the long-term.**

This strategy has been particularly costly for ND's chairman, **Adam B. Bartoš**. **Once as a final and conclusive judgment and once as a judgment that was not final and conclusive, the courts decided that his hateful statements did not simply cross the bounds of decency, but also of the law.** Bartoš was first issued a one-year prison sentence with a two-year suspended postponement for his anti-Semitic performance in Polná u Jihlavy in 2015. Next, he was subject to criminal proceedings related to having allegedly committed several hate crimes and denying the Holocaust. (On 26 January 2018, a judgment that was not final or conclusive issued Bartoš another conditional sentence.)

The ND also filed a complaint against the Ministry of the Interior on the grounds that it was included in the Reports on Extremism. In its statement for the court, the Ministry of the Interior identified four categories that played an important role in deciding to include the party in the Reports. These were: a) hateful statements and activities attacking certain groups in the population, b) statements and activities attacking the principles of pluralist democracy – support of domestic militia groups, intimidation, and insulting of political opponents, c) illegal category – the party leaders have repeatedly found themselves breaking the law in connection to their political activities, and d) the statements and activities of the ND were in contradiction with the interests of the Czech Republic in its relations with other countries.

The ongoing court proceedings have resulted in the party and its chairman moderating their statements.

During the parliamentary elections, the ND ran in a coalition with ROZUMNÍ – Stop migraci a diktátu EU – peníze našim občanům, důchodcům, dětem, zdravotně postiženým... (“THE REASONABLE – Stop migration and EU dictatorship – money for our citizens, pensioners, children, handicapped...”) However, much like the DSSS, the coalition **failed completely, garnering only 0.72 % of votes (36 528 ballots).**

“The Reasonable” ran their own candidate, Petr Hannig, in the presidential election.

On the domestic scene, ND's significance gradually declined. With the exception of bold words and provocative performances, the party failed to spark interest in any issues. It even failed to address activists previously linked to the neo-Nazi movement.

The National Militia (*Národní domobrana*), formerly a project of the ND, became independent of the party. Consequently, internal disputes led to it splitting (see below).

As to the ND's foreign policy orientation, the party acted in support of the current politics of the Russian Federation, particularly as regards the conflict in Ukraine. The ND also promoted the idea of a strategic alliance with Russia based on the so-called Slavic unity. IN accordance with the so-called Eurasian Doctrine, the ND defines itself as

markedly anti-Western due to the West’s “overbearing arrogance”. It claims that liberal democracy is “the worst thing humanity has ever known”.

The ND’s views on foreign policy drew interest from some quasi-media projects.

Generation Identity (*Generace identity*) and Pro-Nation (*Pro-Vlast*)

Generation Identity and Pro-Nation are entities that stemmed from the neo-Nazi movement. Both are personally connected, some members have experience with hooligan battles.

Generation Identity joined the international Defend Europe project, which was supposed to hinder operations aimed at rescuing refugees in the Mediterranean Sea. The initiative was, inter alia, triggered by hoaxes disseminated by quasi-media projects about NGOs, allegedly working together with smugglers and the mafia to bring refugees from North Africa to Europe. After a collection organised among activists, a boat was hired, to sail under the flag of Djibouti. The boat was used to try and block the efforts of rescue vessels belonging to humanitarian organisations. In July, it was detained in Cyprus. Several professional seafarers from the boat were from Sri Lanka, and asked for asylum in Cyprus. Therefore, some Generation Identity members were thus paradoxically detained for smuggling. The departure of professional seafarers from the boat had an effect on the ability of the crew to manipulate it. In August, the boat sent out a call for help. The crew was rescued by a vessel belonging to an NGO helping refugees during maritime rescue operations. In spite of these difficulties, the Generation Identity members reported their activities, which could have genuinely only jeopardised the health and the lives of others, as a great success.

On 17 June, Generation Identity held a demonstration in Berlin. The event was attended by approximately 15 persons from the CR, some of whom actively took part in attacks against the demonstration’s opponents and committed vandalism. These persons are also known for their aggressive behaviour during demonstrations in the CR.

Activists from the Pro-Nation movement mostly come from Prague and Kladno. They do not subscribe to traditional neo-Nazism, having replaced it with so-called positive nationalism. Positive nationalism consists in occasionally organising events beneficial for the public, however strictly limited to serving “our own people”.

The Neo-Nazi Movement

The entirely marginal neo-Nazi movement continued to **organise secret concerts.** In 2017, 14 White Power concerts were recorded, accounting for a significant increase as compared to the previous year, when there were only 9. In October, five persons were detained and charged for the production and distribution of clothing bearing symbols supporting



Right-wing extremists protesting against Prague Pride in August.

and promoting the neo-Nazi movement. Some of the clothing was intended to be exported.

3.4. Anti-Immigration and Anti-Muslim Movement

General Information

The anti-immigration and anti-Muslim movements focus narrowly on one more topics, migration and Islam (sometimes combined). They frames and presents them in a demagogical, manipulative, and even disinformative way (the term “anti-Muslim” is considered more appropriate in this report than the often used adjective “Islamophobic”).

The groupings within this movements cannot be classified as traditionally extremist. Their representatives are not connected to traditional extremist structures and officially distance themselves from totalitarian ideologies. Furthermore, they do not (at least outwardly in official statements) consider violence as a legitimate means of political struggle. However, like other extremists, they use xenophobic populism, to use one example, to obtain political points. Otherwise legitimate topics (e.g. migration, criticism of religion) are used in the political fight primarily as a means to mobilise and to create an image of the adversary, with all the consequences that stem from this approach. Through hateful attacks against certain groups of people, they contribute to fostering an atmosphere of societal fear and to polarisation. Their impact on internal security and democracy of the state and of the society is significantly bigger than that of traditional extremists. This is why they are included in this Report, which is otherwise devoted primarily to extremist entities.

The anti-immigration movement was comprised of diverse elements, which were marked by frequent personal disputes. Some groups split up and former allies were no longer willing to cooperate. The situation was further complicated by the fact that migration as a topic fizzled out and lost its mobilisation potential. Smaller groups lost all political relevance. The only entity that managed to garner success with the topic was Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura (*Svoboda a přímá demokracie – Tomio Okamura*).

Owing to the loss of the mobilisation potential, the anti-immigration movement gradually transformed into an anti-government one. Activists who profited from the migration crisis after it broke out redirected their attention in the course of 2017 to any other topics that accorded them visibility (particularly, criticism of the establishment and of government decisions pertaining to security, social and economic affairs, demanding the resignation of the government, criticism of the EU and NATO, etc.).

In spite of efforts to employ new mobilising topics, **there was a significant decline in the number of public gatherings organised by anti-immigration entities** and their activities in general. Over time, some activists even gave up their activities altogether.

The movement’s activities took the form of demonstrations, debates with citizens, petitions, distribution of leaflets, etc. As opposed to the previous year they were marked by an overall decline in attendance.

No dangerous forms of protest were recorded; most of the more radical manifestations were only verbal. **The internet remained the main platform for anti-immigration statements.**

Alongside their own activities, some activists attended various protests organised by ordinary citizens against government decisions (e.g. protests against the introduction of electronic revenue records, the introduction of the smoking ban in restaurants, etc.).

The main risk presented by the activities of anti-immigration entities continued to consist mainly in the spread of false or manipulative statements that contributed to the polarisation of society and, in extreme cases, led to the radicalisation of a part of society. As in the case of right-wing extremists, it was possible to find a **sympiosis with quasi-media projects**. Anti-immigration and anti-Muslim activists often uncritically disseminated untruthful or distorted messages incessantly produced by these outlets. These, in turn, happily provided airspace to anti-immigration and anti-Muslim activists.

The impact of the Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura movement on the extremist scene

The parliamentary elections clearly demonstrated that **a significant part of the public felt that migration posed a real security risk. The Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura movement** (*Svoboda a přímá demokracie*, SPD), which based its campaign almost exclusively on spreading fear of an alleged “Islamisation”, **managed as the only anti-immigration groupings to gain the most benefit from this fear**. It obtained 10.64 % votes (538 574 ballots) and became the fourth strongest political entity in the CR.

The SPD movement is not, by definition of the Ministry of the Interior, an extremist entity. It has officially distanced itself from totalitarian ideologies, nor does it subscribe to them latently, i.e. through symbols. **However, it has a similar choice of topics as right-wing extremists and often takes similar stances.** In some cases the statements of SPD representatives are even more radical than those of traditional right-wing parties. The SPD movement completely eclipsed traditional right-wing extremist entities, and managed to do a much better job of working with their formerly dominant topics. As regards communication, it presented itself much more professionally to the public, possessing incomparably larger funds. It was not burdened by connection with militant extremists, just as it was not limited by past or current court proceedings linked to its political activity.

For Tomio Okamura, it was not the first time using anti-immigration and anti-Muslim (or Islamophobic) rhetoric. He has expressed anti-Roma stances in the past, when anti-Roma sentiments were more prevalent.

The SPD movement had an unequivocal impact on the domestic extremist scene. Each one of the entities had to define itself in relation to it in some way. Traditional right-wing extremist entities perceived SPD as a competitor and were aware that another entity was entering their traditional playing field. Nevertheless, conscious of the support that SPD received during the elections, the leaders refrained from any serious criticism of Tomio Okamura. On the other hand, left-wing extremists realised early on that the time of DSSS and ND had passed, and felt the need to define themselves much more strongly in relation to SPD.



SPD supporters and their adversaries at the ENF conference in Prague in December 2017

In practice, this was manifested in December 2017 during a rally of the nationalist, Eurosceptic, and anti-immigration fraction of the European Parliament (**Europe of Nations and Freedom, ENF**), which was hosted in Prague by the SPD movement. Although the conference was attended by important European politicians, including Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, traditional right-wing extremists did not support it; what is more, they hardly registered it. On the contrary, anarchists, but also a handful of public representatives and activists

tried to disrupt the event, particularly by blocking the arrival of important anti-immigration politicians.

3.5. Paramilitary and Militia Groups

General Information

In 2017, paramilitary and militia groups were significantly weakened. These entities originated mainly in connection with the migration crisis. With its retreat, their mobilisation potential diminished. **Both the number of active members and activities of these groups declined.** Conflicts between individual groups led to further divisions.

Unlike in 2016, these groups no longer tried to create the impression that Czech security forces were incapable of protecting the Czech territory. **On the contrary, several of them wanted to cooperate with security forces and with municipal councils** in order to coordinate the protection of safety in city streets. Representatives of some groups also made efforts to legalise militia groups. There were attempts to take part in public subsidised and training projects.

The state of individual militia groups continued to differ. **Only some regional cells were capable of meeting more or less regularly and organising paramilitary training or shooting exercises.** Other activities included participation at various recruitment days and public events organised by other entities. On some occasions, some groups tried to monitor the streets or the German and Polish borders.

The National Militia (Národní domobrana, NDB) and **Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush for Peace** (Českoslovenští vojáci v záloze za mír, ČSVZ) tried to create the impression of being organisations with a nation-wide scope, however their cells were active in

only a handful of regions, particularly in Northern Moravia, in Prague, and in Central Bohemia.

The specificity of Northern Moravia was that members of different paramilitary groups maintained contacts and cooperated. Furthermore, they sought to establish cooperation with the leadership of the ČSVZ and the NDB. However, their effort were not successful due to animosities among the leaders.

The NDB was perhaps the most active and most visible group, particularly as regards its active cells. This groups, however, struggled with internal divisions among leaders, which culminated in October 2017 when part of the membership left the group. Most of the “renegades” joined a newly formed group called the Land Militia (Zemská domobrana). Some cells became entirely independent.

The militia continued to be characterised by their pro-Russian orientation (in the political sense). Nevertheless, there was no evidence to their operations being influenced or directly controlled by the intelligence services of the Russian Federation. Some entities demonstrated personal ties and support to persons currently operating in the territory of eastern Ukraine controlled by separatists.

The militia groups continued to be critical towards the EU and NATO.

The militant group **Odin’s Soldiers**, which was joined by former neo-Nazis and hooligans from the Ústecký Region, showed practically no activity in 2017. One of its leaders was sent to prison, having been sentenced for illegal activities with an extremist subtext.

3.6. Left-Wing Extremism

General Information

The extreme left continued to have few members in 2017. It lacked a leading figure or collective that would be able to unify the highly fragmented wing.

Apart from a few exceptions, the extreme left sought to work with topics that show **promise for involving the wider public.**

The anarchist movement once again outpaced radical communist activists with both its activities and its significance. The anarchists managed to find better mobilising topics and to present themselves more effectively via the internet and various events. In reaction to past or current criminal proceedings, the anarchists intensified and improved their “methodical counselling” on how to deal with police practices, particularly when using the internet and during public events. Their work was clearly inspired by that of colleagues abroad, with whom they maintained frequent contacts.

The pro-immigration activities of extreme left groups stagnated, which was caused mainly by the declined interest in the migration topic from their ideological opponents.

Public Events Organised by Left-Wing Extremists in 2017

Type of Event	Number
Public rallies, protests	42
Concerts	89
Other	104
Total	235

The **total number of 235 public events** is significantly higher than in 2016, when there were only 133. The category “other” includes, for example, lectures, discussions, workshops etc.

The Anarchist Scene

Militant anarchists, including supporters of insurgent anarchism, were minimally active in 2017. Activities of the **Network of Revolutionary Cells** were only recorded on the internet. Texts promoting sabotage, giving specific instructions, or celebrating mass riots appeared on some web pages. They were clearly inspired by other European countries, where the number of anarchists is higher and their activities incomparably more radical and violent.

The anarchists were further divided by their approach to so-called insurgent anarchism. Some of the radical activists supported direct action. Nevertheless, most anarchists denounced violent acts, since these elicit negative responses from the public and attract police attention.

The Anarchist Federation (Anarchistická federace), **the No to Racism Initiative** (Iniciativa Ne rasismu) and **Anti-Fascist Action** (Antifašistická akce) **were the most active anarchist groups.** They organised various concerts, happenings, and solidarity events. The No to Racism Initiative often took part in organising protests and ensuring their “security”. In Ostrava, the Ostrava Anarchist Federation (Ostravská anarchistická federace) was founded and organised several public events. On the other hand, the North Bohemian Anarchist Federation (Severočeská anarchistická federace) failed to manifest itself meaningfully.

The organisation of solidarity events was also taken up by the Anarchist Black Cross (Anarchistický černý kříž) **and the Antiphoenix collective** (Antifénix). In addition to raising funds at charity events, they organised lectures on police tactics and practices.

Following a break, the so-called solidarity network SOLIS Praha resumed its activities. The network is a self-proclaimed radical union organisation defending employees in disputes over allegedly unpaid wages and benefits. Its model for solidarity networks was adopted from abroad, and consists in using a wide spectrum of coercive methods against employers. In the past, cases were recorded in the CR where the solidarity campaign culminated with attacks against property.

The traditional anarchist May Day assembly was held in Prague, carrying the motto: “The End of Bad Work”. This, in itself quite legitimate, topic was apparently meant to attract a wider spectrum of supporters of leftist ideas. The assembly was attended by about 300 people, and was not accompanied by any disruptions to public order.

The anarchists also participated in various anti-xenophobic events, where they met with other human rights activists. On May Day in Brno, some of them took part in protests against the march organised by the Workers' Youth. Later, however, the anarchists began to mainly criticise the SPD. On 21 October 2017, several dozen anarchists protested against their electoral success. In December 2017, some 150 left-wing extremists demonstrated alongside other protesters against the Europe of Nations and Freedom rally, mentioned above.

A novelty was that the anarchists began, in greater part, to get involved in ecological activism. **They began to take active part in the activities of some ecological entities. They attended an event in Horní Jiřetín called Klimakemp**, held in June by a group called We Are the Limits (Limity jsme my). Klimakemp was attended by some 300 activists. After some of them entered the nearby Bílina mine without authorisation, 133 persons were arrested. The participants included local and foreign left-wing extremists. Ecology is perceived by anarchists as an attractive and legitimate topic, which at the same time allows them to carry out direct actions.

The previously common fight against traditional right-wing extremists in the streets took the back seat due to the significant decline in neo-Nazi activity. However, anarchists continued to keep a close watch on right-wing extremists.

Local activists attended events abroad. **The most notable of these were undoubtedly the July protests against the G20 Summit in Hamburg.** They were attended by 30 activists from the CR; 3 persons were detained during violent protests, 2 persons were charged for attacking police officers or other violent behaviour. Attendance ranging between 30 – 50 persons was recorded at protests to protect the climate and against using fossil fuels, which took place in November in Germany. Due to the size of these protests, the number of Czech activists present remained marginal.

In 2017, anarchists showed practically no activity directed against the Ministry of Defence.

Squatting was a significant mobilisation factor, particularly in the context of supporting the Autonomous Social Centre Klinika (Autonomní sociální centrum Klinika). Activists did not vacate the premises after the expiration of the vacation period. On the contrary, they intensified their activities. In June 2017, a group of squatters temporarily occupied the unused buildings in Hybernská and Senovážná streets in Prague. Several activists were led out by the police and presented at a police office.



Assembly in support of Klinika, attended by anarchists. Prague, April 2017.

The Radical Communist Scene

Radical communists remained fragmented into several collectives with a very small membership, as they were incapable of attracting new supporters. The Union of Communist Youth and the Union of Young Communists of Czechoslovakia continued to be idle. Some representatives, nevertheless, attended events where the presence of pro-Russian subjects was reported.

As opposed to the previous year, Trotskyist groups dampened their activities particularly in the pro-refugee area. The Left Perspective (Levá perspektiva) was marked by a greater inclination towards communist groups. Socialist Solidarity and the Libreds group focused more on cooperation with anti-authoritarian platforms. Their membership base remained very small.

The rhetoric of radical communists continued to be reminiscent of that preceding 1989, including the commemoration of communist anniversaries. Radical communists remained true to their bipolar vision of the world, allegedly divided into supposedly progressive and supposedly imperialistic and exploitative regimes that are in perpetual conflict. In line with this ideological concept, radical communists attended thematic meetings with like-minded colleagues abroad.

While most radical communist groups talked about the need to unify their political spectrum, none have taken any concrete steps towards actual unification. Their attitude towards the Communist Party of Czechia and Moravia was also contradictory. In some cases, the party as a whole was criticised for not being radical enough, while some of its members, whose statements were incompatible with democratic principles, were praised.

3.7. The Risks of Religion-Motivated Extremism

The migration wave did not have a significant effect on the composition of domestic religious communities. The CR was definitely not a target country for Muslims from abroad. In 2017, there were 1 450 applications for international protection, of which 1 142 were new and 308 repeated. Most applications were filed by nationals of Ukraine (435), followed by Armenia (129), Georgia (129), and Azerbaijan (127). A total of 1 506 decisions were issued granting international protection. Asylum was granted to 29 persons, supplementary protection was granted to 118 persons. There were 572 applications asking for the extension of previously granted supplementary protection. A total of 508 decisions were issued, extending supplementary protection in 393 cases. Detailed statistics are available here (in Czech): <http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/statisticke-zpravy-o-mezinarodni-ochrane-zajednotlive-mesice-v-roce-2017.aspx>.

In 2017, the Czech Muslim community was mostly moderate and could be described as integrated. This is confirmed by experts from the PCR as well as the intelligence services. Nevertheless, security forces **reported several individuals who expressed radical views within a limited circle of people.**

The gradual defeat of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and in Syria brings with it an **increased risk of returning foreign fighters.** These persons pose a threat particularly

because of their combat experience and high level of radicalisation. They may negatively influence communities in their home countries and may engage in the preparation of a terrorist attack. There was no mass influx of these persons, however. **The CR is perceived as a transition country, not a destination country.** The PCR tackled several cases where there was suspicion that persons attempting to transit through the CR had been active in a terrorist organisation.

To date, 11 Czech nationals that travelled abroad to support religious extremist organisations have been reported. Some of them are under criminal proceedings.

Several Czech nationals joined the activities of Kurdish armed groups operating mainly in Iraq and in Syria.

The PCR investigated several cases where financial and logistical support was provided to terrorist groups abroad. It also investigated several cases of persons suspected of providing training, medical, or other material support to terrorists in the CR.

Security forces also monitored high-risk foreigners that were involved in spreading radical interpretations of Islam. These were mostly persons from Central Asia and the Caucasus, who were trying to establish contacts in the CR. The views of some public representatives, as well as the pro-Israeli stances of the state and its representatives, were the main potentially radicalising topics.

The Internet remained the most important medium for spreading jihadist propaganda. Messages posted on the Internet included calls to commit or support terrorist attacks in the West.

There have been no open manifestations of international terrorism in the CR. **Since the attack at Zaventem Airport in Brussels in March 2016, the threat level in the CR has been set to the first tier.** This tier signifies that there is no knowledge of a specific threat of terrorist activity in the CR, but acknowledges that there is a general threat of terrorism.

In section 3.8.9., which contains information from the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, gives more details on two criminal proceedings that are related to terrorism: **approval of a terrorist attack in Berlin and preparation for engagement in the fight in the ranks of the so-called Islamic State in Syria.**

Security forces and the state administration devote their highest attention to religious extremism and terrorism. This is a top-priority topic, with a range of measures being implemented with the goal of preventing violent manifestations. The CR is an active long-term member of a number of international initiatives. The topic is further discussed in the Situation Report on Internal Security and Public Order in the CR in 2017, which enumerates some of the measures aimed at preventing terrorism and protecting soft targets. It is also worth highlighting the entirely new Concept of Soft Target Protection 2017 – 2020 which, alongside the Action Plan for the Fight against Terrorism 2016 – 2018, introduces a range of new measures to strengthen security.

3.8. Statistics of Criminal Activity with an Extremist Subtext

3.8.1. Introduction

Police statistics are processed on the basis of the **Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium** (Evidenčně statistický systém kriminality Policejního prezídia, ESKK). **Statistical data of the Ministry of Justice, which also form the basis for the statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, are processed on a different timeframe than police statistics.** For the Ministry of Justice, the decisive element is not when a crime has been committed, but the time when a public prosecutor prepared the indictment, decided on the cessation of the prosecution, etc. The absence of an interconnectedness of these three statistics is a drawback, nevertheless it is technically impossible to solve the issue at present.

Prior to 2009, police statistics were governed by Act No. 36/1960 Coll., on the Territorial Division of the State, as amended. Therefore, statistics formerly distinguished between 7 regions and Prague. Since 1 January 2010, statistics are broken down according to higher territorial units, and therefore distinguish between 14 regions. This change complicates year on year comparisons of regional data before and after 2009.

The ESKK was developed in the 1970s. Recently, many of its indicators have been found to be obsolete and inadequate. Therefore, **a major reconstruction of this system was initiated** in 2016. The reconstruction aims to bring the data up to date with current conditions, refine them, simplify their calculation and make them accessible to the general public in a more comprehensible and approachable form.

This reconstruction involves **a transition to different software. The manner of data flow from the information system of Evidence of Criminal Proceedings to the ESKK is also being changed. Algorithms calculating statistical numbers are being reviewed.** The reconstruction, assessment, and modification of the system are carried out while it is running, and continuously fine-tuned. The result of this reconstruction in its final form will be the incompatibility of the data with the previous period, especially as regards the indicators of the number of prosecuted persons and criminal offences committed by them.

There has been a fundamental change in the system to count prosecuted persons. In the past, only the most serious criminal activity was attributed to the prosecuted person. If, under one reference number, the perpetrator committed murder as well as negligence of mandatory support, they were counted only as a person prosecuted for murder. Currently, all criminal activities will be taken into account when counting the number of prosecuted persons. Statistically, this will manifest as a difference between the number of offenders for the total number of criminal offences, and the sum of the number of offenders by individual types of criminal offences. **One perpetrator will be counted as many times as the number of criminal offences they committed.**

In the past, statistics of crimes committed by police officers were processed by the Inspectorate of the Police of the Czech Republic, which was replaced as of 1 January 2012 by the General Inspectorate of Security Forces. Therefore, data from 2011 is provided by the General Inspectorate.

Within the non-standard statistical outcomes, the PCR has been processing statistics related to detected criminal offences with an anti-Semitic subtext since 2005.³ As of 1 January 2005, the classification of extremist criminal offences in the ESSK was extended to include codes allowing for the identification of crimes motivated by religious or ethnic hatred against Jews and the Jewish faith, including attacks against Jewish Community edifices and their facilities, synagogues, and Jewish cemeteries.

Since 2011, the reports include the number of criminal offences motivated by hatred of the Roma. It is necessary to add some clarifying comments to these statistics. Police statistics not distinguish victims of crime according to their ethnicity or nationality. The only distinction is citizenship, i.e. whether the victim was a foreigner. The ESSK, however, records criminal offences motivated by racial hatred or hatred of Bohemians (Czechs), Moravians, Silesians, Poles, Germans, Ukrainians, the Vietnamese, Hungarians, Russians and Ruthenians, the Roma, Jews, Arabs, the Chinese, and other nationalities. For a criminal offence motivated by hatred of the Roma to be recorded in police statistics, the following conditions must be met: 1) the police officers must evaluate the act as a criminal offence with an extremist subtext when filling out the relevant form, 2) the victim must state that s/he is a Roma or that the criminal offence was committed against an object with clear ties to the Roma ethnicity (e.g. spraying a racist inscription on a Roma Holocaust memorial, a museum of Roma culture, etc.). Therefore, crimes against the Roma are not included in police statistics when an anti-Roma subtext has not been proven (e.g. when a car is stolen from a Roma without the perpetrator knowing that the owner was a Roma, etc.). A number of Roma in the CR, moreover, do not avow their Roma ethnicity. These statistics are therefore only indicative and have limited predictive value.

Police statistics are built solely for a yearly comparison, not a monthly one. The calculations and comparisons are always carried out from 1 January until the end of the reference period. Therefore, the numbers for individual months cannot be obtained. Given that criminal proceedings are an ongoing process, a simple subtraction of consecutive periods would produce an imaginary number which could, under certain circumstances, have a negative value.

The total number of prosecuted persons is not the sum of values, since one person can commit criminal offences in several regions as well as several offences and would therefore be counted several times. This is valid as of 2016.

3.8.2. National Statistics

A total of 202 303 criminal offences were committed in the CR in 2017. Those with an extremist subtext accounted for 0.08 % of the total. In 2017, the PCR **recorded 153 criminal offences with an extremist subtext. The annual comparison shows an increase in the number of recorded offences with an extremist subtext by 10.**

Of the aforementioned criminal offences, **66.7 % were solved, i.e. 102** (in 2016 the number was 69.2 %, i.e. 99 criminal offences). In 2017, **132 persons were prosecuted** for criminal offences with an extremist subtext.

³ Preceding this expansion, there was an increase in the number criminal offences with an anti-Semitic subtext. The topic of anti-Semitism thus became a priority for the EU as well as for international organisations.

The Total Number of Criminal Offences with an Extremist Subtext Recorded in the CR between 2006 and 2017

Year	Recorded Criminal Offences	Share in Total Crime Figures (%)	Solved Criminal Offences	Prosecuted and Investigated Persons
2006	248	0.07	196	242
2007	196	0.05	119	181
2008	217	0.06	126	195
2009	265	0.08	186	293
2010	252	0.08	168	231
2011	238	0.08	157	246
2012	173	0.06	116	208
2013	211	0.06	144	198
2014	201	0.07	132	157
2015	175	0.07	114	154
2016	143	0.07	99	x
2017	153	0.08	102	132

Source: PCR, 2017

3.8.3. Regional Statistics

Criminal Offences by Region	Period 1 January – 31 December 2017	
	Recorded	Solved
Hl.m. Praha	34	13
Středočeský	10	7
Jihočeský	6	5
Plzeňský	8	6
Ústecký	19	14
Královéhradecký	8	5
Jihomoravský	7	5
Moravskoslezský	27	19
Olomoucký	9	7
Zlínský	10	9
Vysočina	4	4
Pardubický	2	0
Liberecký	6	5
Karlovarský	3	3
TOTAL	153	102

Number of Prosecuted Persons

Region	Period 1 January – 31 December 2017	
	Number	
Hl. m. Praha	22	
Středočeský	12	
Jihočeský	3	
Plzeňský	7	
Ústecký	19	
Královéhradecký	5	
Jihomoravský	6	
Moravskoslezský	25	
Olomoucký	9	
Zlínský	9	
Vysočina	7	
Pardubický	0	
Liberecký	5	
Karlovarský	3	
TOTAL	132	

In 2017, most criminal offences with an extremist subtext were committed in Prague (34), followed by the Moravskoslezský region (27) and the Ústecký region (19). The largest number of persons prosecuted for criminal offences with an extremist subtext were recorded in the Moravskoslezský region (25), followed by Prague (22) and the Ústecký region (19).

3.8.4. Statistics by Criminal Offence

Number of Criminal Offences

Tactical-Statistical Classification	Period 1 January – 31 December 2017	
	Recorded	Solved
Grievous Bodily Harm (Sec. 145–146 (a))	7	5
Violence against a Group of People and Individuals (Sec. 352)	20	15
Dangerous Threatening (Sec. 353)	0	0
Damage to a Thing of Another (Sec. 228)	3	2
Disorderly Conduct at Sports and Public Events (Sec. 358)	12	10
Spraying (Sec. 228 (2))	5	0
Defamation of a Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group (Sec. 355)	21	14

Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or Suppression of their Rights and Freedoms (Sec. 356)	15	6
Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements aimed at the Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms (Sec. 403, 404, 405)	70	50
TOTAL	153	102

The most frequent criminal offences recorded in 2017 were those classified as “Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements aimed at the Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms” (Sec. 403, 404, 405), amounting to 70. They were followed by criminal offences under Sec. 355 “Defamation of a Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group”, amounting to 21, and criminal offences under Sec. 352 “Violence against a Group of People and Individuals”, amounting to 20.

Number of Prosecuted Persons

Tactical-Statistical Classification	Period 1 January – 31 December 2017
	Number
Grievous Bodily Harm (Sec. 145–146 (a))	15
Violence against a Group of People and Individuals (Sec. 352)	14
Dangerous Threatening (Sec. 353)	0
Damage to a Thing of Another (Sec. 228)	4
Disorderly Conduct at Sports and Public Events (Sec. 358)	12
Spraying (Sec. 228 (2))	1
Defamation of a Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group (Sec. 355)	15
Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or Suppression of their Rights and Freedoms (Sec. 356)	7
Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements aimed at the Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms (Sec. 403, 404, 405)	67
Total	132

In 2017, the PCR recorded 132 persons prosecuted for criminal offences with an extremist subtext. Most often, this was for offences classified as “Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements aimed at the Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms” (Sec. 403, 404, 405), for which 67 persons were prosecuted. Next were criminal offences classified as “Defamation of a Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group” under Sec. 355, for which 15 persons were prosecuted.

3.8.5. Criminal Activity Motivated by Hatred against Selected Groups

In 2017, 27 criminal offences with an anti-Semitic subtext were recorded. This was one less than in 2016.

Criminal offences with an anti-Semitic subtext accounted for 17.6 % of the total number of criminal offences with an extremist subtext committed in 2017. In 2016, it was 19.6 %.

In 2017, 27 criminal offences motivated by hatred of the Roma were recorded. This was two less than in 2016. These criminal offences accounted for 17.6 % of the total number of criminal offences with an extremist subtext committed in 2017.

In 2017, the PCR recorded **three criminal offences motivated by hatred of Muslims.** In 2016, there were seven. In the same year, the PCR also recorded **two criminal offences motivated by hatred of Arabs.** This was six less than in 2016.

3.8.6. Criminal Offences Committed by Members of Security Forces

Just as in 2016, the General Inspectorate of Security Forces did not launch criminal proceedings against any member of security forces in 2017.

3.8.7. Criminal Offences Committed by Members of the Army of the Czech Republic

In 2017, the Military Police recorded **one case of illegal activity with an extremist subtext.** It concerned a reasonable suspicion of a soldier having committed a violation classified as expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppressing human rights and freedoms by posting photographs, on his publicly available Facebook account, showing right-wing extremist signs and symbols tattooed on his forearm. At the initiative of commanding authorities, the Military Police launched criminal proceedings to clarify the facts of the case. Information gathered during the investigation led to the prosecution of the soldier in question for the aforementioned offence in October 2017. In November 2017, the file with a motion to file an indictment was forwarded to the competent State Prosecutor's Office.

The soldier in question filed a request for dismissal and, in accordance with Sec. 19 (1) (k) of Act No. 221/1999 Coll., on Professional Soldiers, as amended, was dismissed as of 31 October 2017.

Military Intelligence had information about persons working in the lowest ranks of the Army of the CR having connections with the extreme right. These individuals did not act in coordination and, in most cases, did not volunteer information about their inclination to extreme right ideas in the work environment.

3.8.8. Court Statistics

In 2017, courts in the CR issued final verdicts to 55 705 persons (61 399 in 2016, 65 569 in 2015, 72 854 in 2014, 77 976 in 2013, 71 471 in 2012, 70 160 in 2011, 69 953 in 2010, 73 752 in 2009, 75 751 in 2008). This accounted for a decline by 5 694 persons, i.e. 9.27 %, as compared to 2016. Out of this number, **47 persons were convicted in 2017 for criminal offences with an extremist subtext.** This number accounts for only 0.08 % of the total number of persons convicted in 2017.

As compared to 2016, there were fewer persons convicted for criminal offences with a racial subtext (by 30 persons, i.e. 39 %, while there were 77 persons convicted in 2016, 54 in 2015, 52 in 2014, 71 in 2013, 83 in 2012, 111 in 2011, 96 in 2010, 103 in 2009, and 97 in 2008). It is evident from this data that the share of these offences on the total number of convictions remains very low. In absolute numbers, it has been oscillating between 50 – 100 offenders.

In 2017, perpetrators were convicted for the following criminal offences:⁴

Criminal Offence	Provision of the Criminal Code	Number of persons
		2017
Grievous Bodily Harm	Sec. 146	2
Robbery	Sec. 173	2
Endangering a Child's Care	Sec. 201	1
Damage to a Thing of Another	Sec. 228	6
Threatening with the Intention to Affect a Public Official	Sec. 326	1
Violence against a Group of People and Individuals	Sec. 352	10
Dangerous Threatening	Sec. 353	1
Defamation of a Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People	Sec. 355	5
Instigation of Hatred Towards a Group of People or of Suppression of their Rights and Freedoms	Sec. 356	5
Spreading Alarming News	Sec. 357	1
Disorderly Conduct	Sec. 358	21
Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms	Sec. 404	23
Denial, Impugnation, Approval and Justification of Genocide	Sec. 405	3

In 2017, most persons were convicted for expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms under Sec. 404 of the Criminal Code – 23 persons. Next were persons convicted for disorderly conduct under Sec. 358 of the Criminal Code – 21 persons. The third most frequent offence was violence against a group of people and individuals under Sec. 352 of the Criminal Code – 10 persons.

Five persons were issued imprisonment sentences for the abovementioned criminal offences with a racial subtext. Of these, 2 persons were identified as recidivists. Four perpetrators were sentenced to imprisonment with a maximum custodial sentence of 1 year, 1 perpetrator was sentenced to imprisonment with a custodial sentence ranging from 5 to 15 years. An imprisonment sentence with a conditional suspension of the sentence was issued to 27 persons in 2017. Community service sentences were issued in 8 cases. One youth perpetrator and 2 women were convicted.

⁴ The total number is higher than 47 because one perpetrator can be (and often is) convicted for several criminal offences.

3.8.9. Statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office

Overview of criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic, and other hatred between 1995 and 2017

Criminal Offences Motivated by Racial, Ethnic, and Other Hatred	Persons Prosecuted (figures in brackets indicate shortened preliminary criminal proceedings)	Persons Accused (figures in brackets indicate shortened preliminary criminal proceedings)
1995	508	461
1996	616	552
1997	569	495
1998	535	439
1999	580	510
2000	535	451
2001	529	369
2002	467 (+51)	435 (+50)
2003	325 (+44)	286 (+44)
2004	351 (+48)	326 (+47)
2005	294 (+46)	264 (+45)
2006	221 (+52)	192 (+51)
2007	204 (+36)	197 (+36)
2008	200 (+41)	185 (+40)
2009	194 (+34)	183 (+32)
2010	225 (+63)	213 (+58)
2011	218 (+66)	209 (+59)
2012	224 (+65)	213 (+61)
2013	120 (+81)	115 (+77)
2014	139 (+45)	129 (+43)
2015	130 (+29)	115 (+22)
2016	95 (+33)	92 (+30)
2017	98 (+31)	90 (+29)

The statistics of the Ministry of Justice show that **in 2017, there was a slight increase in the number of persons prosecuted for criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic, and other hatred, amounting to 98 persons** (+3 as compared to 2016). In 2017, 90 persons were accused of committing criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic, and other hatred (-2 as compared to 2016). **There was also a slight decrease in the number of persons subjected to shortened preliminary criminal proceedings** (-2 as compared to 2016). The total number of persons against whom a motion for punishment was filed in 2017 was 29 (-1 as compared to 2016).

In 2017, 39 188 persons were prosecuted in the CR, 37 924 in shortened preliminary criminal proceedings. A total of 35 121 persons were accused, and a motion for punishment was filed against 35 690 persons. The table shows that **the share of criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic, or other hatred in the total number of criminal offences remained very low in 2017**. The share of prosecuted persons (including in shortened preliminary criminal proceedings) for criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic, or other hatred in the total number of criminal offences (including in shortened preliminary proceedings) was 0.167 %. In the case of persons accused (including those against whom motions for punishment were filed) of having committed criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic, or other hatred, their share in the total number of accused persons (including those against whom motions for punishment were filed) was 0.168 %. In spite of this, these criminal offences should not be underestimated, and it is necessary to pay due attention to the issue.

Persons prosecuted and accused for having committed offences motivated by racial, ethnic, and other hatred between 1995 and 2017

CR	Sec. 196/2 old CC		Sec. 196/3 old CC		Sec. 198 old CC		Sec. 198a old CC		Sec. 219/2g old CC		Sec. 221/2b old CC	
	Sec. 352/2 CC		Sec. 352/3 CC		Sec. 355 CC		Sec. 356 CC		Sec. 140/3g CC		Sec. 146/2e CC	
	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused
1995	177	162	18	17	112	108	28	22	0	0	13	12
1996	210	179	18	17	74	66	30	29	1	1	90	82
1997	150	119	29	19	107	103	25	20	0	0	56	55
1998	126	111	3	0	124	90	7	6	3	2	40	36
1999	139	123	24	24	103	91	12	11	2	2	42	42
2000	98	84	24	24	150	129	19	14	0	0	22	13
2001	95	92	0	0	127	118	19	16	0	0	28	27
2002	85	81	3	3	105	98	4	3	2	2	21	20
2003	64	56	0	0	81	77	8	7	0	0	28	27
2004	67	63	8	8	105	101	5	5	1	0	21	21
2005	74	67	0	0	85	78	3	2	3	3	14	14
2006	48	45	0	0	58	50	3	1	0	0	11	11
2007	33	31	0	0	37	35	24	24	0	0	24	24
2008	31	30	0	0	36	35	7	7	1	1	5	5
2009	33	32	6	6	19	19	7	4	0	0	19	19
2010	46	44	40	37	39	38	6	4	0	0	7	7
2011	41	39	38	37	35	35	5	5	1	1	17	16
2012	41	40	29	28	34	31	8	7	0	0	23	22
2013	15	15	5	5	27	25	2	2	0	0	21	21
2014	13	12	3	3	23	18	6	6	2	2	8	8
2015	17	15	5	5	25	24	4	3	0	0	6	5
2016	17	17	19	19	17	17	7	5	0	0	3	3
2017	10	8	3	3	10	9	6	5	0	0	13	12

CR	Sec. 222/2b old CC		Sec. 235/2f old CC		Sec. 257/2b old CC		Sec. 260 old CC		Sec. 261 old CC		Sec. 261a old CC	
	Sec. 145/2f CC		Sec. 175/2f CC		Sec. 228/3b CC		Sec. 403 CC		Sec. 404 CC		Sec. 405 CC	
	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused
1995	23	23	0	0	6	5	13	11	118	101	0	0
1996	42	41	1	1	27	25	30	27	93	84	0	0
1997	45	43	5	5	18	15	29	18	105	98	0	0
1998	28	28	6	6	16	16	27	15	155	129	0	0
1999	30	28	1	0	16	16	52	37	159	136	0	0
2000	12	12	0	0	7	6	79	67	124	102	0	0
2001	6	6	3	3	2	2	51	41	198	164	1	0
2002	24	24	2	2	3	3	75	67	143	132	1	1
2003	13	13	0	0	6	4	28	17	96	84	1	1
2004	9	5	4	4	1	1	31	25	96	90	3	3
2005	7	7	0	0	2	2	23	18	72	65	1	1
2006	3	3	0	0	2	2	16	11	78	69	2	0
2007	3	3	0	0	5	5	14	12	63	62	1	1
2008	9	9	0	0	2	2	29	29	72	61	8	6
2009	21	21	0	0	1	1	25	24	66	60	4	4
2010	1	1	1	0	1	1	39	38	42	40	2	2
2011	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15	62	57	4	4
2012	2	2	2	2	1	0	27	27	52	49	5	5
2013	3	3	0	0	1	1	18	18	27	24	1	1
2014	3	3	1	1	3	3	15	15	57	53	5	5
2015	2	2	0	0	3	3	8	8	57	47	3	3
2016	1	1	0	0	3	3	0	0	27	26	1	1
2017	1	1	0	0	5	5	2	0	44	43	4	4

The table above shows the number of persons prosecuted and accused for having committed criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic, or other hatred.

The number of persons prosecuted and accused for having committed offences motivated by racial, ethnic, or other hatred in 2017 was almost equal to that of the previous year (see table above). However, statistics of the Ministry of Justice for 2017 show a different distribution of crime with regards to offences motivated by racial, ethnic, or other hatred as compared to the previous year.

In 2017, there was an increase in the number of persons prosecuted and accused for expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms under Sec. 404 of the Criminal Code (17 prosecuted persons and 17 accused persons more than in 2016) **and for causing grievous bodily harm under Sec. 145 (2) (e) of the Criminal Code** (10 prosecuted persons and 9 accused persons more than in 2016).

There was also a slight increase in the occurrence of denial, impugnation, approval and justification of genocide under Sc. 405 of the Criminal Code (3 prosecuted persons and 3 accused persons more than in 2016) **and causing damage to a thing of another** under Sec. 228 (3) (b) of the Criminal Code (2 prosecuted persons and 2 accused persons more than in 2016).

On the contrary, there was a significant decline in 2017 in the occurrence of violence against a group of people and individuals under 352 (3) of the Criminal Code (16 prosecuted persons fewer than in 2016 and 16 accused persons fewer than in 2016). **There was also a decline in the occurrence of violence against a group of people and individuals** under Sec. 352 (2) of the Criminal Code (7 prosecuted persons and 9 accused persons fewer than in 2016), defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other group of people under Sec. 355 of the Criminal Code (7 prosecuted persons and 8 accused persons fewer than in 2016).

Although 2 persons have been prosecuted in 2017 for the establishment, support and promotion of movements aimed at suppression of human rights and freedoms (2 persons fewer than in 2016), no charges were filed. **No murders have been committed** under Sec. 140 (3) (g) of the Criminal Code and no Extortion under Sec. 175 (2) (f) of the Criminal Code.

Expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms under Sec. 404 of the Criminal Code **was the most frequently occurring offence, similarly to previous years.**

Just as in 2016, no offences motivated by racial hatred caused deaths. There were no arson attacks on Roma families. One of the observed trends was a **slight decline in the promotion of extremist movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms. However, there was an increase in hate speech on the Internet, particularly on social media**, where it remained virtually impossible to prosecute every such offence, especially because of the difficulty of proving the authorship of such statements.

Hate speech, which previously targeted the Roma in particular, partially shifted towards Muslims, migrants, and persons favourable towards them. Physical attacks against Muslims and immigrants have not been registered, which is probably related to the negligible size of both groups in the CR. However, such attacks cannot be ruled out in the future given the hateful mood in a part of society. The issue of offences motivated by racial, ethnic, or other hatred, extremism, will continue to be given due attention by public prosecutors in 2018.

Overview of selected offences motivated by extremism, racial hatred or xenophobia recorded in 2017 by the Department of Criminal Prosecution of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office:

Sale of Clothing Bearing Defective Symbols

Note: This is in fact the only recorded case of widespread support and promotion of (traditional) neo-Nazi ideology in 2017, and probably stems from the partial weakening of the extreme right.

This particular case concerned the production and distribution (mostly during White Power concerts) of t-shirts, jumpers, and other clothing items bearing neo-Nazi symbols. Prosecution of the accused persons began on 31 October 2017 for the establishment, support, and promotion of movements aimed at the suppression of human rights and freedoms under Sec. 403 (1), (2) (a) (b) of the Criminal Code.

Approval of a terrorist attack in Berlin

In December 2016 and January 2017, a nineteen year-old middle school student approved of a terrorist attack committed in Berlin on 19 December 2016 in front of his classmates. He regretted that there were not more dead and sympathised with the so-called Islamic State. His actions were qualified as approval of a criminal offence under Sec. 365 of the Criminal Code and expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms under Sec. 404 of the Criminal Code. By order of the District Court in Třebíč dated 13 September 2017, effective as of 20 October 2017, the student was issued a suspended imprisonment sentence.

Note: Actions such as the ones described above are, as of 1 February 2017, i.e. from the entry into force of the amendment of Act No. 455/2016 Coll., qualified as an offence – support and promotion of terrorism under Sec. 312e (1) of the Criminal Code – punishable by a custodial sentence ranging from two to ten years.

Raising a Daughter to be Racist

The accused was recording his six year-old daughter beating a pillow with a baseball bat, while asking her whether the pillow was a “Gypsy” or a Muslim, and encouraging the girl to “give him a good beating and break some of his bones” and to “tell him that he’s a Gypsy and that Gypsies are “fuckers””. He posted the video to Facebook on 31 July 2017. BY criminal order of the District Court in Benešov dated 13 September 2017, effective as of 16 October 2017, the man was issued a suspended imprisonment sentence for endangering a child’s care under Sec. 201 (1) (d) of the criminal code and for instigation of hatred towards a group of people or suppressing their rights and freedoms under Sec. 356 (1), (3) (a) of the criminal code.

Hate Speech against J. B.

With regards to the Order of T. G. Masaryk not being awarded to J. B., the accused stated on Facebook on 26 October 2016 that he was “going to kill that Jew, it’s a shame that the Germans didn’t finish him off (...) personally, if I were to meet J. B., I’d kill him too, finish what the Germans started and didn’t finish”. By criminal order of the District Court in Šumperk dated 30 October 2017, effective as of 17 November 2017, the accused was issued a conditional sentence for the denial, impugnation, approval and justification of genocide.

The following are three cases of hate speech attacking R. B.’s reaction to the Czech Nightingale music award being awarded to the band Ortel (the cases were only recorded by the Department of Criminal Proceedings of the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office in 2017, and are therefore included in this report):

Hate Speech I.

In a Facebook discussion commenting the reaction of R. B., the accused published a lengthy post, which called for the killing of the Roma and contained statements (e.g. that “a concentration camp should be built for those fucking Jews” – pursuant to a discussion about the Jewish cemetery in Prostějov) that fulfilled the criteria of four offences: defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other group of people under Sec. 355 (1) (a) and (2) (b) of the Criminal Code; violence against a group of people and individuals under Sec. 352 (2) of the Criminal Code; instigation of hatred towards a group of people or suppressing their rights and freedoms under Sec. 356 (1), (3) (a) of the Criminal Code; and expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms under Sec. 404 of the Criminal Code. An indictment was filed on 2 September 2017.

Hate Speech II.

In a Facebook discussion commenting the reaction of R. B., the accused published a post calling for the expansion of Nazism and for the gassing of “blacks, Jews etc.”. By criminal order of the District Court in Kladno dated 25 August 2017, effective as of 17 November 2011, the accused was issued a sentence of community service for expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms under Sec. 404 of the Criminal Code.

Hate Speech III.

In a Facebook discussion commenting the reaction of R. B., the accused published a post that said “don’t throw the Gypsies into one sack, but straight into a gas chamber”. BY order of the police authority of 29 November 2011, criminal prosecution was initiated for instigation of hatred towards a group of people or suppressing their rights and freedoms under Sec. 356 (1), (3) (a) of the Criminal Code.

Below is some information on the procedural developments of some cases that were mentioned in last year’s report:

Preparation for Fighting within the Ranks of the so-called Islamic State in Syria

The accused (an ethnic Czech) converted to Islam on the basis of self-study and began to sympathise with the so-called Islamic State, intending to travel to Syria and join its fighters. Along the border with Syria, he booked a motor vehicle he wanted to use for the journey to Syria, where he would contact the Islamic State fighters and join their ranks. In February 2016, he flew to Istanbul, where he was detained by the Turkish authorities, and was returned to the CR. After the instigation of criminal proceedings, he made a full confession, admitting that he wanted to fight alongside the Islamic State and, if ordered, was prepared to carry out executions. In the course of December 2016, an indictment was issued for preparation of a terrorist attack under Sec. 20 (1) and Sec. 311 (1) (a), (3) (a), (b) of the Criminal Code. The accused committed the act entirely by himself, and he was not in contact with any other person or group.

The accused was issued an unconditional imprisonment sentence of three years and three months in a guarded prison by order of the Regional Court in Plzeň dated 24 February 2017, and this for attempting to support and promote terrorism under Sec. 312e (3) (a) of the Criminal Code. He was also assigned outpatient protective psychiatric treatment. Both the accused and the public prosecutor filed an appeal, pursuant to which the High Court in

Prague dismissed the sentence and issued a new imprisonment sentence of six years in a guarded prison. The defendant's appeal was dismissed as unfounded. The defendant filed another appeal, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 20 September 2017 under Sec. 256i (1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code for being unjustified.

3.8.10. Statistics of the Probation and Mediation Service

The aggregate number of files that the Probation and Mediation Service (PMS) has handled since its establishment shows that the share of PMS files related to crimes motivated by extremism remains low. Since 2002, these files account for 0.2 – 0.7 % of the total number of newly registered files in a given year. **In 2017, their share was 0.2 %.** This was the same share as in the previous year.

Offences with an extremist subtext in individual judicial regions between 2013 and 2017

Judicial Regions	2013 total no. of case files	of which those with an extremist subtext	2014 total no. of case files	of which those with an extremist subtext	2015 total no. of case files	of which those with an extremist subtext	2016 total no. of case files	of which those with an extremist subtext	2017* total no. of case files	of which those with an extremist subtext
Praha	1 964	3 (.2 %)	2 593	12 (.5 %)	2 841	13 (.5 %)	2 748	8 (.3 %)	2 523	6 (.2 %)
Středočeský	3 090	14 (.5 %)	3 793	5 (.1 %)	3 604	6 (.2 %)	3 539	8 (.2 %)	3 268	4 (.1 %)
Jihočeský	1 794	12 (.7 %)	2 211	4 (.2 %)	2 277	7 (.3 %)	2 066	4 (.2 %)	1 858	4 (.2 %)
Západočeský	2 557	2 (.1 %)	3 038	4 (.1 %)	3 014	6 (.2 %)	2 885	3 (.1 %)	2 648	5 (.2 %)
Severočeský	4 178	20 (.5 %)	5 619	18 (.3 %)	5 373	7 (.1 %)	5 371	19 (.4 %)	5 037	10 (.2 %)
Východočeský	2 844	7 (.2 %)	3 000	4 (.1 %)	2 809	0 (0 %)	2 757	1 (0 %)	2 660	6 (.2 %)
Jihomoravský	4 228	9 (.2 %)	4 966	8 (.2 %)	4 853	7 (.1 %)	4 588	13 (.3 %)	4 149	4 (.1 %)
Severomoravský	5 373	9 (.2 %)	6 317	4 (.1 %)	5 965	11 (.2 %)	5 833	4 (.1 %)	5 576	7 (.1 %)
TOTAL CR	26 028	76 (.3 %)	31 537	60 (.25 %)	30 736	57 (.2 %)	29 787	60 (.2 %)	27 719	46 (.2 %)

Source: PMS

* preliminary data as of 3 January 2018, changes in single numbers are possible

In terms of criminal law classification, **most of the files** handled by the PMS in 2017 were related to the **instigation of hatred towards a group of people or suppressing their rights and freedoms** under Sec. 352 of the Criminal Code. These files accounted for 40 % of all recorded files dealing with offences associated with or motivated by extremism.

Several files were related to expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms under Sec. 404 of the Criminal Code and defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other group under Sec. 355 of the Criminal Code. In 2017, these accounted for 34 % and 17 % of cases, respectively.

The occurrence of other criminal offences (Sec. 356, 403, 405) in PMS records was negligible.

4. Foreign Influences Affecting the Czech Extremist Scene

In 2017, the Czech extreme right and extreme left continued to be closely linked to events abroad. This part of the report describes the main international links of the Czech extremist scene, including important events that concerned partner organisations and participation in transnational groups. Within this topic, international events with relevant Czech participation are monitored, as well as the most important events abroad noted by Czech extremist entities, as well as other foreign manifestations of extremism. The abovementioned aspects naturally intertwine in a number of cases.

In 2017, **migration policy was a dominant topic for the extreme right** with links to the CR, **with anti-Islamism** or anti-Islamisation **playing an important role**. These topics created a footing for the enforcement of the goals of the extreme right, incompatible with the contemporary concept of a constitutional democratic state. In 2017, several serious and violent hate crimes were committed by right-wing extremists across the world. Nevertheless, as regards electoral gains, right-wing extremist parties suffered some failures when their potential electorates were taken over by parties that were often – however not always – classified as right-wing populist. **The extreme left mobilised itself in reaction to the rise of right-wing populism**. During the protests against the G20 Summit in Hamburg in early July, it demonstrated its ability to organise **mass militant activities with a focus on anticapitalism and antiglobalisation**. Contrary to previous years, there was a loosening of some ties and influences, e.g. regarding the influence of the conflict in Ukraine on events in the CR (which does not mean, however, that these links and influences disappeared completely).

4. 1. Right-Wing Extremism Abroad with Influences in the CR

In 2017, the involvement of right-wing extremists from the CR in pan-European extreme right structures was significant. Several political parties, classified as right-wing extremist by academic and official documents abroad, are grouped under the **Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF)**, which includes the **DSSS**. The DSSS organised an APF conference in **Brno** on 18 November 2017. The APF chairman, **Roberto Fiore**, from the Italian neo-Fascist New Force (*Forza Nuova*), gave a speech at the conference. The event was further attended by representatives of the **National Democratic Party of Germany** (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, NPD), the **People's Party Our Slovakia** (*Ludová strana Naše Slovensko*, LSNS), the Romanian **The New Right** (*Noua Dreaptă*), and individual members of the APF, such as the British long-term extreme right activist **Nick Griffin**.

The **Identitary Movement** was very active internationally in 2017. A branch of the movement, called Generation Identity (*Generace Identity*), is active in the CR. The movement has branches in other countries (Germany, Austria) which are classified as extremist in official police and intelligence documents. A significant and widely reported international activity of the Identitary Movement, which took place in 2017, was the **Defend Europe** project. It consisted of sailing the **C-Star** in the Mediterranean with the aim of **preventing illegal migration into Europe**. The crew was largely made up of members of the Identitary Movement, mostly from Italy, France, and Germany. Czech members of the movement provided promotional support and collected funds. The development of the Identitary

Movement in the CR was significantly boosted by the translation into Czech of Markus Willinger's book **Generation Identity: A Declaration of War against the '68ers**, published by **Arktos** in London. The book itself cannot be straightforwardly classified as extremist, however it may help with radicalisation.



The Defend Europe logo. Source: Twitter.

Czech and Slovak right-wing extremists continued to maintain traditionally close ties in 2017. The main Slovak extreme right entity is the **ESNS**, which is represented within the National Council of the Slovak Republic since 2016. During the 2017 regional elections, the party leader **Marián Kotleba** did not defend his post as regional leader (*župan*) in Banská Bystrica, having collected **23.24 %** of the votes and lost to the independent candidate Ján Lunter (48.53 % of the votes). During the parliamentary elections in the CR in 2017, Marián Kotleba expressed support for his party's long-standing partner, the DSSS. Representatives of the ESNS, along with other random Slovak right-wing extremists, attended extreme right events in the CR, such as the May Day rally in Brno. Czech right-wing extremists expressed solidarity with prosecuted or administratively sanctioned members of the ESNS. Late in the year, the Slovak MP Milan Mazurek was issued a court sentence for his anti-Roma statements, but filed an appeal. In May 2017, the Prosecutor General of the Slovak Republic filed a **proposal to ban the ESNS**, but the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic did not make a decision before the end of the year. This legal act, too, received negative responses from Czech right-wing extremists. Czech bands, which are sometimes included in the spectrum of so-called White Power Music, gave concerts in Slovakia. The venue at **Plavecký Mikuláš** plays an important role in this regard. Prior to the concert of the Czech group **Violence Station** in this town, **Slovak security forces carried out administrative measures** (against which members of the group intended to defend themselves legally). In 2017, cooperation continued between extremist football hooligans from both countries.

In early 2017 in **Germany**, the Federal Constitutional Court rejected a proposal to ban the **NPD**. The court stated in its ruling that, while the NPD may strive to **dismantle the foundations of a free and democratic state**, there is not enough evidence that it could be successful in its efforts. The court thus basically said that, while the party is breaching the constitution, it is so insignificant that **it lacks the clout to implement its plans**. Therefore, it may continue to operate. The court indicated the possibility that legislators may limit state funding of anti-constitutional parties. The decision spurred both positive and negative reactions in Germany. The NPD, meanwhile, is a long-standing partner of the DSSS and the

case was compared to that of the dissolution of the Czech Workers' Party in 2009–2010. In the course of 2017, representatives of the DSSS or the DM met several times with their partners from the NPD, or with the Young Nationalists (*Jungen Nationalisten*, JN), the youth branch of the NPD. For example, during the so-called Saxon-Czech Cultural Days in April 2017, a JN delegation along with representatives of the **Nordic Resistance Movement** (*Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen*) from Finland and Sweden visited Ústí nad Labem, where they were met by members of the DM. Then, DM and DSSS representatives visited the NPD prior to the federal elections in Germany. Nevertheless, these elections were not a success for the NPD, where it garnered only 0.4 % of the votes.

It is likely that a part of the NPD's potential electorate was won over by the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD), which as a whole is not classified as extremist by German state authorities. However, the Bavarian Office for Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, BfV) monitored **Petr Bystroň**, chairman of the Bavarian branch of the AfD (until November 2017). After Bystroň was elected into the Bundestag in September 2017, the monitoring ceased. Bystroň's political activities are – also thanks to his Czech origin – popularised also in the CR, and not just among extremists, but also within the wider political and media spectrum.

As regards other selected events, Czech representatives were invited to take part in the neo-Nazi rally in Berlin to mark the **30th anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess**, who was sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. The promotional leaflet was translated into several languages, including Czech. It called for attendance at the rally with the slogan: **“Murder is not statute-barred! – Release the files! – Justice instead of revenge!”** In the end, on 19 August the rally was blocked by protesting anti-Fascists. Cooperation continued between representatives of the White Power scene in both countries. There are ample contacts between right-wing extremists in Germany and the CR, nevertheless according to the responses of the Bavarian Government to interpellations in the Bavarian Parliament held on 29 September 2017 (ref. no. 17/17184), the intensity of contacts between Bavarian and Czech right-wing extremists is declining.


Aufruf ▼ Kontakt Material

MORD VERTÄHRT NICHT!

GEBT DIE AKTEN FREI - RECHT STATT RACHE!

Aufruf – Tschechisch

Vražda je jediný zločin, který nelze promlčet

Suche 

The Czech version of the invitation to the rally marking the 30th anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess in Berlin. Source: <https://www.mord-verjaehrt-nicht.info/wp/aufruf/aufruf-tschechisch/> (no longer accessible).

In Germany, the so-called Citizens of the Reich (*Reichsbürger*) movement continues to be on the rise. Members of the movement do not recognise the legitimacy or legality of the current Federal Republic of Germany and subscribes to the continuation of the German Reich, whose citizens they consider themselves to be. According to the Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution, they numbered more than 15 000 people in 2017, with some members belonging to the extreme right and using, or ready to use, violence. According to the responses of the Federal Government to interpellations of MPs by the left in the Bundestag on 14 February 2017 (ref. no. 18/11158), **one of the prosecuted members of Citizens of the Reich** used to have an address in the CR – in 2015. The movement may have several contacts in the CR, but they are not presented publicly.

Compared to previous years, the number of extreme right attacks on targets associated with migrants declined. In November 2017, however, the mayor of Altena, Andreas Hollstein, was slightly injured during a knife attack by an individual, most probably for his welcoming approach to refugees. The case of a Bundeswehr soldier, detained in April, also deserves attention. The soldier was pretending to be a refugee and was allegedly planning to execute politically motivated violent activities. The case was not resolved before the end of 2017. As regards violent right-wing extremism, the process with the so-called **Freital Group** (*Gruppe Freital*), also known as Civil Defence Freital (*Bürgerwehr Freital*) or Civil Defence FTL/360 (*Bürgerwehr FTL/360*), was watched with close attention in Germany. Members of the group were suspected of having committed attacks in 2015 against targets associated with asylum seekers. They used **explosives purchased in the CR**. They faced potential conviction for having created a terrorist association. The court in Dresden began its work on 7 March, and has not issued a decision before the end of the year.

Since 2013, a trial has been ongoing at the High Court in Munich with Beate Zschäpe, who is suspected of having participated in the activities of the neo-Nazi group **National Socialist Underground** (*Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund*, NSU). In May 2017, the German weekly Der Spiegel published information on the fact that another terrorist group, called the Second Spring (*Zweiter Frühling*), continued the work of the NSU, and was allegedly preparing attacks on the Roma. In connection with group's activities, German security forces were interested in **two Czech** and one Hungarian **right-wing extremists**. Nevertheless, the case, which was riddled with ambiguities, fizzled out.

The development of right-wing extremism was very dynamic in Poland, where Czech right-wing extremists maintain traditionally strong contacts. In Poland, right-wing extremists enjoy a stronger social standing than would be suggested by their representation in Parliament. For several years now, the main activity of the Polish extreme right has been the organisation of the so-called **Independence March** (*Marsz Niepodległości*) on the occasion of the anniversary of Poland's independence on 11 November, which has largely outgrown the limits of right-wing extremism. Its main organiser is an eponymous association. One of the main speakers at the event in 2017 was the Italian neo-Fascist politician **Roberto Fiore**; a representative of the Slovak ĽSNS also made an appearance. Among the 60 000 participants were many who didn't subscribe to right-wing extremism and simply expressed their patriotism and religious fervour (the march was held under the slogan "We Want God"). However, the so-called **Black Block** was created within the march, which was made up primarily of members of extreme right entities. Banners and slogans of the Black Block carried hateful messages. On the eve of the march, organisers of the Black Block from the **Szturmowcy group and the National-Social Congress** (*Kongres Narodowo-Społeczny*) organised a conference called "Europe of the Future", where representatives of several

extreme right organisations made appearances, including those of **White Rex** from Russia or **National Corps** (*Nacjonalnij korpus*) from Ukraine. The attendance of these entities was interesting because some Polish right-wing extremists historically hold anti-Russian or anti-Ukrainian positions. Both the conference and the march were, as regards the Black Block, attended by representatives of **Autonom.cz – Revolutionary Nationalists** (*Autonom.cz – Revoluční nacionalisté*) from the CR.



Forming the Black Block during the Independence March in Warsaw on 11 November 2017.

In 2017, as usual, right-wing extremists also followed events in Hungary. In February, the traditional neo-Nazi rally “**Day of Honour**” was held in Budapest on the occasion of the 1945 battle for Budapest. It was attended by representatives of several Hungarian right-wing extremist organisations and European branches of the neo-Nazi network **Blood & Honour**, as well as other entities. The event was supported by extremists from the CR, nevertheless most likely not by direct participation in the march. A new extreme right party was founded in Hungary, called “Force and Fearlessness” (*Erő és Elszántság*). However, so far its standing on the Hungarian scene remains insignificant and it has no known direct contacts with the CR. The new party is trying to target a part of Jobbik’s membership base which is unsatisfied with its moderate direction. Its ambition is to create a nationwide network of supporters. So far, it succeeded in establish branches in several smaller towns and in the countryside. The White Power music scene in the CR and in Hungary continue to remain in contact.

In Russia, the extreme right continues to be divided by links to historical roots and the current regime. This was manifested – traditionally – by separate demonstrations in Moscow on the occasion of the Day of Unity. Designated as the **Russian March**, representatives of

several anti-Putin entities, including neo-Nazi ones, met in Moscow's Lyublino district under the leadership of the "Nation and Freedom" Committee (*Комитет «Нация и Свобода»*). The demonstration was terminated by the police. The nationalist-imperial **Russian National March** was held on the same day near the Oktyaborskoe pole station. According to the anti-racist centre Sova, attendance at the marches was lower in 2017 than in previous years, counting only about 400 participants. Contrary to previous years, no ties to the CR were reported.

White Rex merchandise, popular among neo-Nazis and linked to political neo-Nazi structures, continues to be exported from Russia to a part of the Czech martial arts community, which has connections to right-wing extremists. Unlike Czech neo-Nazis, the Czech nationalist extreme right with a pan-Slavic orientation usually respects the official policies of the current Russian regime without mediation by extremist pro-Kremlin organisations.

In 2017, there were no particularly intense links between Czech and Ukrainian right wing extremists. This is due to the departure of some Czech fighters, formerly active in the Azov Regiment or in the "Right Sector" Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, to other countries or to the CR. However, in 2017 **Ukraine** saw a significant and violent activation of the neo-Nazi organisation **C14** (formerly Sič, wherefore the letters S/C in Cyrillic; the number 14 refers to the 14 words by David Lane). Its members violently attacked their political opponents. In March 2017, the organisation, in cooperation with several neo-Nazi organisations, contributed to publishing the National Manifest. It was founded in 2010 and its original, out-of-date website is hosted on a **Czech domain**, although no direct links to the CR are known. In CR, fans of the football club **Donetsk Shakhtar, which is currently located in Lvov**, agitated in favour of the organisation. **Some of the club's promotional merchandise used in the CR carries neo-Nazi symbolism** (such as the SS *Totenkopf* symbol).



A Donetsk Shakhtar fan sticker, with a partially covered Totenkopf symbol, in Prague.

In 2017, there were three violent acts linked to right wing extremism, where the perpetrators used a vehicle as a weapon in order to drive into a crowd of opponents or adversaries. On 19 June, **Darren Osborne** rammed a car into a group of Muslims standing in front of a mosque in **Finsbury Park in London**. He killed one person and injured nine others. The victim who dies was Makram Ali. Osborne's act was qualified as a terrorist act and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On 29 June in France, a driver attempted to ram a car into a crowd standing in front of a mosque in the **Créteil** neighbourhood in Paris, however he was stopped by security barriers. The perpetrator was a 43-year old Armenian, who had been treated for schizophrenia in the past. The court did not consider this case a terrorist attack. A third similar attack was carried out on 12 August 2008 in **Charlottesville, USA**, where a white supremacy activists **James Alex Fields** rammed a car into a group of demonstrators, who had gathered in order to protest a rally held by opponents of the proposed removal of a statue of general Lee. Heather D. Heyer, a participant among the anti-racists, was killed during the attack. Czech right-wing extremists recorded both attacks, but serious considerations to imitate them are not known. Some right-wing extremists in the CR have **criticised the declaration of a state of emergency**, issued by the Governor of Virginia following the attack in Charlottesville with the aim of preventing further unrest, because they understood it to be a result of the extreme left's pressure.

The extreme right attack that had the largest number of victims in 2017 in the West was that of 29 January at the Sainte-Foy mosque in Quebec. The perpetrator was, Alexandre Bissonnette, a student, who killed six and injured another 19 persons. Several violent attacks, which injured three Muslims in Dijon, France, were claimed by the Commando for the Protection of the People and the French Nation (*Commando de défense du peuple et de la patrie française*). According to the Commando's own words, it was inspired by Anders Breivik.

4.2. Left-Wing Extremism Abroad with Influences in the CR

In 2017, as in previous years, left-wing extremists around the world focused on anticapitalist and usually also anti-American and anti-Israeli topics. Attitudes towards current politics of Russia and related aspects (e.g. the politics of Bashar Assad's Syria) were a dividing line of sorts within the extreme left. The Marxist-Leninist wing of the extreme left celebrated the 100th anniversary of the so-called Great October Socialist Revolution in 2017. However, given the current international situation and the state of the communist movement, the celebrations had no real significance. The protests against the G20 Summit in Hamburg were of great importance for the autonomous and anarchist wings.

The **G20 Summit**, bringing together the twenty most advanced countries in the world, took place in **Hamburg on 7 and 8 July**. A series of protests against the summit culminated in mass violence. The protests were attended by approximately **75 000 people** from around the world, some **4 000** of whom took part in **violent illegal activities**. 31 000 police officers were tasked with maintaining order; almost 500 of them suffered injuries. Already before the summit, Germany was subject to a several-month long **arson and sabotage campaign** targeting edifices linked to capitalist globalisation and the system of repression. This campaign continued after the summit as retaliation of left-wing extremists for repressions, even in countries other than Germany (e.g. Greece).

Violent incidents were mostly carried out by members of the Black Block, which went through a revitalisation in Hamburg within the ultra-leftist and antiglobalisation movement. The first wave of violence during the protests was reported during the Welcome to Hell demonstration on Wednesday, 6 July. However, the main incidents occurred during the evening demonstrations on 7 July and afterwards, when, particularly in the St. Pauli neighbourhood, there was massive **looting and burning of cars**. The extent of the violence sparked great resistance on the part of the German public and political representation, even in the ranks of the parliamentary extreme left.

This resulted in state repressive measures, including a ban of the association **linksunten.indymedia**, whose websites had previously also repeatedly provided information about events in the CR. The ban applied to the operation, hosting, and other uses of the website <https://linksunten.indymedia.org>, including those in the Tor network. Furthermore, a ban was issued on the association's presentation on Twitter, and the email address linksunten@indymedia.org was disabled. However, the concerned persons filed an appeal against the ban, though no decision had been issued before the end of 2017.

A large part of the German militant extreme left considered the events in Hamburg to have been a success, and claimed responsibility, as evidenced by the compilation of declarations on the summit titled "Smoke Signs. Words and Actions against the G20 World", published by **Autonomous Groups** (*Autonome Gruppen*).

The anti- G20 Summit protests were attended by a large number of foreigners, who also constituted substantial numbers of those detained for suspicion of having committed offences. Agitation to participate in the protests also took place in the CR. **Several dozen Czechs** from the Trotskyist and anarchist wings attended the protests, although it is unknown how many were involved in illegal activities. At least **one** Czech citizen, Artyom K., was sentenced to a conditional 18-month sentence and a EUR 1 600 fine for attempting to commit **serious bodily harm** (throwing rocks and bottles at police officers) during the protests. A special branch of the German police, **SOKO Schwarzer Block**, is prosecuting or searching for some 3 500 perpetrators, most of whom remain unidentified, however. Therefore, at the end of 2017, the police published photos of many of the suspected persons online at <https://www.polizei.hamburg/g20-fahndungen/>, which triggered a storm of dissent in the extreme left wing.

A part of the Czech extreme left cooperate with activists from the German **Ende Gelände** campaign, which cannot, however, be described as extremist on the whole, since not all of its activists are left wing extremists. Its main objective is to fight climate change, wherefore it also protests against the expansion of coal mining. However, it is this effort that connects it to the extreme left, which supports the initiative. As the government of North Rhine-Westphalia said in response to a parliamentary interpellation regarding police readiness to Ende Gelände activities in the Rumanian Basin at the end of August 2017 (Ref. No. 17/248), the **Interventionist Left** (*Interventionistische Linke*, IL), which was mentioned in the section on left-wing extremism in the regional report on protection of the constitution, expressed support for Ende Gelände. In government in Brandenburg stated, in response to a parliamentary interpellation in 2017 (Ref. No. 6/7481), that because some Ende Gelände campaign organisers were members of IL **the extreme-leftist influence of the entire campaign could not be stated**. The Interventionist Left was founded in 2005 as an **informal network** of about thirty organisations, which see themselves as a neo-dogmatic and emancipatory left. According to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, IL

aims to connect the extreme left spectrum as well as exert influence over organisations not falling under the extremist wing.

German left-wing extremists are also active in support of their Czech counterparts. On 8 November 2017, in the evening, unknown perpetrators **damaged** a wall, camera equipment, and artwork belonging to the **General Consulate of the CR in Dresden** by spraying dark green paint. In a letter sent to the local daily newspaper, the perpetrators identified themselves as **“Friends of the Social-Cultural Centre in Prague – Klinika”** (*Freunde des soziokulturellen Zentrums in Prag – “Klinika”*) and justified their activity with the imminent eviction of the centre in Prague.

In Aachen, Germany, a trial took place in 2017 involving two defendants charged with robbing a bank in the city in 2014. Whilst one of the accused was released for lack of evidence, the other, Lisa D., of Austrian-Italian origin, was sentenced to seven and a half years imprisonment. The gang she was leading had robbed the bank of more than EUR 400 000. According to the investigators, the robbery was one in a series (the other robberies have not been solved) that served to finance the squatter scene in Barcelona. An extensive international anarchist campaign was rolled out in support of Lisa D. Anarchists in the CR also expressed their sympathies. Posters supporting her carried the slogan: **“Robbing a bank is not a crime; establishing one is.”** Lisa D.’s activities were referred to as **“the expropriation of a bank”**. The **Network of Revolutionary Cells** capitalised on the Aachen case to call for more fighting in its November declaration, which was translated into several languages and disseminated within the militant extreme left cyber environment.



A poster supporting the convicted extremist in Aachen at the anarchist centre Salé in Prague.

An extensive extreme left terrorist campaign was rolled out in Greece in 2017. Greece has for a long time been characterised by the strongest rate of extreme left violence in the EU.

Currently, a new generation of left-wing extremist terrorists is active there. An increasing intensity of attacks raised concerns in 2017. The most serious consequence was probably the injury of former Greek Prime Minister **Lucas Papademos**, his driver and another passenger during a bomb explosion in the Prime Minister's car on 25 May. The attack was claimed by a group called **Conspiracy of Fire Cells**. The **Group of Folk Fighters**, operating since 2013, was also active in 2017. On 22 December, the group carried out a bomb attack on the Court of Appeals building in Athens. By the end of December 2017, a new group, called **Black and Green Arsonists**, threatened to poison selected food items in Greek supermarkets with acid unless these items were withdrawn from sales. It did not follow through on the threat. Various groups committed a number of arsons. One worth mentioning was the attack on the headquarters of SYRIZA on 20 February, claimed by the **Group of Anarchists, Communists, and Anti-Nomenklaturists**. The activities carried out in Greece are promoted on international communications platforms of the extreme left. As has been shown in recent years, they have the potential to influence the activities of left-wing extremists in the CR. Nevertheless, in 2017, no direct links between Greek terrorists and Czech left-wing extremists was reported for the purpose of this report.

The anarchist scene with links to the CR is active in several Eastern European countries. In 2017, in Russia and in particular in **Belarus**, it faced severe government repression and hostile activities by right-wing extremists (similar hostilities and activities are on the rise in Ukraine, as well). In spring, Belarussian anarchists were the most visible group of protesters against the so-called subsistence tax and were also subject to administrative detentions lasting up to 15 days (even repeatedly) and fines. The situation is monitored by Czech anarchists, for instance the imprisonment of Russian anarchist **Pyotr Ryabov** in Belarus. The events are discussed at international anarchist and new left events. For example, during the anti-Fascist demonstration "For Your and Our Freedom" to protest the March of Freedom in Warsaw, members of the anarchist block demanded freedom for Belarussian anarchist prisoners. Some Czech took part in the demonstration, as well.



Support for Belarussian anti-Fascist prisoners at a demonstration in Warsaw on 11 November.

There are several organisations in Russia that have a positive attitude to the current regime and, in their political activities, walk the fine line between left-wing extremism and intolerant nationalism. In 2017, **SERB – South East Radical Block** – gained attention. SERB was founded in the spring of 2014 in Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, and other cities with the original aim of creating an autonomous republic in the South-East of Ukraine. Having failed, its leading members immigrated to Moscow. Its chairman is the former actor **Igor Beketov**. In Russia, SERB members violently attack representatives of opposition anti-Putin organisations. In May 2017, an attack, linked to SERB, was carried out on the opposition leader Alexei Navalny. The perpetrator used a chemical (the so-called Zelyonka, or brilliant green) and damaged Navalny's eyesight. Beketov, however, distanced himself from the attack and called it a provocation against SERB. Russian officials claim not to have anything to do with SERB activities. In the CR, SERB activities are not yet significantly promoted within the so-called quasi-media and pro-Kremlin media environments, although awareness of the group exists in these circles.

In 2017, there were power clashes on the territory of the separatist republics in Eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces attempted to centralise power and weaken the influence of individual armed forces. This process also involved **pro-separatist foreign fighters from the CR**, who are currently concentrated mainly in the units of the so-called **Republican Guard of the Donetsk People's Republic**. The effort of some separatist leaders to create a new state, **Little Russia**, which would include a substantial part of the present Ukraine (including Kiev), ended in failure. In spite of the temporary support by quasi-media projects, the effort did not

garner a significant response and soon fell into disrepute. Controversial events in the so-called Luhansk People's Republic and the so-called Donetsk People's Republic did not draw significant comments from the Friends of the LPR and the DPR Society, which operates as an association in the CR and was not very active save at the beginning of 2017.

Left wing extremism in the CR was also influenced by Catalan separatist efforts. This was because like-minded partners from the Catalan political spectrum supporting the independence of **Catalonia** are important for the Trotskyist and anarchist wings. For the Marxist-Leninist and so-called alternative pro-Kremlin wings, the Catalan case and its controversial solution by the Spanish government (particularly the referendum of 1 October) represent an opportunity to weaken the EU and the credibility of its proclaimed democratic values (despite the fact that the decisive forces on the Catalan political spectrum are aiming for the inclusion of an independent Catalonia in the EU). Catalan separatist attitudes enjoyed support by some left-wing extremists during demonstrations in Prague and in some of their own media. However, these attitudes were also popular outside the given environment. IN Catalonia proper, an organisation called **Arran** drew attention in 2017. This separatist, socialist, and feminist youth organisation was founded in 2012. Arran became known for attacks on tourist targets (including a bus full of British tourists), because they disagree with the massive influx of tourists into Barcelona and other places. These attacks against property were publicised and could serve as inspiration for groups in tourist destinations in other countries.



In the USA, in connection with the election of Donald Trump as President and his tenure in the Office, and in connection with racial unrest and efforts to remove Confederate monuments from the time of the Civil War (which are understood as symbols of racism), left-wing extremism increased, with groups uniting under the traditional name Antifa. Within pro-

Trump circles in the USA, there were efforts to include Antifa on the list of terrorist groups, which was not possible due to the structure of the US counter-terrorism policy. However, Antifa was mentioned in some police documents as an extremist group. In support of American anti-racist forces and in opposition to President Trump, a large part of the extreme left in Western countries, including the anarchist and Trotskyist wing in the CR, mobilised in Charlottesville following the President's statements regarding the case.

4.3 Other Risky Phenomena in Border Regions with the CR

In Bavaria and Saxony in Germany, but also in Upper and Lower Austria, the number of immigrants rose starkly, culminating in 2015. In spite of the drop in the intensity of the migration flow, new immigrants continued to arrive in 2017. A significant number of these persons was housed in the mentioned regions. Their coexistence with the local population is not, due to their number, always without conflict.

The edifices where the immigrants were housed were the targets of repeated attacks by German and Austrian extremists, and there were some kerfuffles between the immigrants and locals.

On the other hand, there were also some cases in both Germany and Austria of violent attacks committed by immigrants, which escalated the atmosphere even further.

Due to the considerably lower numbers of immigrants in the CR, these problems have not yet spilled over into Czech territory. The security situation in the border regions continues to be monitored and assessed by security forces.

5. List of Abbreviations

APF – Alliance for Peace and Freedom

CR – Czech Republic

ČSVZ – Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush for Peace (*Českoslovenští vojáci v záloze*)

DSSS – Workers' Party of Social Justice (*Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti*)

DM – Workers' Youth (*Dělnická mládež*)

ESSK – Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium (*Evidenčně statistický systém criminality*)

ND – National Democracy (*Národní demokracie*)

NDB – National Militia (*Národní domobrana*)

NPD – National Democratic Party of Germany (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*)

PCR – Police of the Czech Republic (*Policie České republiky*)

PMS – Probation and Mediation Service (*Probační a mediační služba*)